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OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (the "Opinion")
was issued on March 3,1992.

It was published at 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 65

(Utah App. 1992). The opinion was filed March 3, 1992. The court of
appeals Case No. is 910561-CA. The opinion was authored by Norman H.
Jackson, Appellate Court Judge, and concurred in by the two other judges
on the panel, Judith M. Billings and Leonard H. Russon. A copy is attached
as Appendix 1.
On March 17, 1992, appellee First Colony filed a petition for
rehearing. On April 17, 1992, pursuant to request from the Court of
Appeals, appellant filed a response to the petition for rehearing.
On May 22, the court of appeals entered its order denying the
petition for rehearing. A copy is attached as Appendix 2.
JURISDICTION
A.

On March 3, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals decision was

B.

No orders concerning extensions of time within which to

filed.
petition for certiorari have been requested or made.
C.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter

pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (3) (a) and (5) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In May of 1986, LaMar Stevenson, having been delinquent on
several premiums due on a life insurance policy with Chubb Life
American, was cancelled by Chubb.

Stevenson then sought new life

insurance coverage on himself through Roger Fleiss, and Talbert
Corporation, Fleiss's employer.

Talbert Corporation and Fleiss

recommended to Stevenson that he seek life insurance through First Colony
Life Insurance Company. Opinion at 2.
Stevenson filled out and signed an application provided by Talbert
Corporation through Fleiss for life insurance with First Colony in June,
1986. The application was signed by Stevenson as the proposed insured, by
Roger Fleiss as witness, and by Norman Close of the Denver office of
Talbert Corporation as licensed registered agent. Stevenson tendered a
check, dated July 7, 1986, in the amount of $410.00, payable to First
Colony. This check represented the first semiannual premium payment for
a $500,000 life insurance policy. A conditional receipt was issued to
Stevenson by First Colony which set forth the conditions under which
conditional coverage would become effective prior to policy delivery. The
receipt was dated July 7, 1986, and bears the signature of Norman Close.
First Colony negotiated Stevenson's premium check shortly thereafter.
Opinion at 2. All parties agree that the life insurance policy became
effective at that time.
In August of 1986, Maurine Stevenson, LaMar's wife, contacted the
Salt Lake office of Talbert Corporation to ask why her husband had not
received a policy from First Colony. The record indicates that she spoke
to an unidentified person in the office, who informed her that First Colony
was not going to insure LaMar, because one of his companies was in
bankruptcy. Neither Stevenson nor his wife received notice of declination
from First Colony. The parties do not dispute that First Colony did not
notify either of the Stevensons personally or by any form of written notice.
Nothing in the record indicates First Colony sent written notice to Talbert
Corporation, and the record is unclear as to how someone at Talbert
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Corporation became aware that First Colony had declined Stevenson's
application. Opinion at 2.
Stevenson sought life insurance coverage with Bankers Life
Company in early October 1986. After he completed the necessary
information on the application, he gave the application to Norman Close,
who disclosed on the application that Stevenson had been declined coverage
by First Colony. Norman Close never discussed this addition to the
application with the Stevensons. LaMar Stevenson was killed in an accident
on October 18, 1986.

At the time of his death, neither United

Underwriters nor First Colony had returned the premium of $410.00 paid
by Stevenson. The premium payment was not tendered to Maurine
Stevenson until December, 1986. Opinion at 3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Maurine Stevenson, filed this action against defendants
First Colony, Roger Fleiss, and Talbert Corporation, claiming that a valid
contract of insurance existed at the time of her husband's death, since no
notice of rejection of the life insurance application was given by First
Colony and the premium payment was not returned until months after
Stevenson's death.
On October 19, 1989, First Colony filed a motion for summary
judgment, contending that the temporary contract of insurance created by
the conditional receipt terminated with First Colony's rejection of
Stevenson's insurance application and oral notification to the Stevensons,
through Fleiss or Talbert Corporation. Maurine Stevenson countered with
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that a valid contract of insurance
remained in force as a result of the failure of First Colony to give notice of
rejection and to return the premium.
3

The trial court granted Maurine Stevenson's motion for summary
judgment and denied First Colony's motion. The trial court entered
judgment in the amount of $500,000 for Maurine Stevenson. On March 2,
1990, the trial court vacated its earlier order and entered judgment for
Maurine Stevenson in the amount of $300,00, based on the terms of the
conditional receipt.
Both parties appealed. Maurine Stevenson appealed the trial court's
determination that the amount of the policy which became effective upon
issuance of the conditional receipt was $300,000, arguing that judgment
should be for $500,000, the face amount of the application.
First Colony appealed the trial court's determination that life
insurance coverage was in effect at the time of the Stevenson's death.
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, that the
amount of temporary insurance in effect at the time of Stevenson's death
was $300,00, the amount printed on the conditional receipt, and not
$500,000, the amount requested in the application.
The Court of Appeals also held that notice must be clearly and
unequivocally communicated to the applicant in an unambiguous manner,
and that First Colony did not effectively dispatch notice to Stevenson that
his temporary insurance was terminated.

4

ARGUMENT
I.
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED
CERTIORARI SINCE THE APPELLATE COURT DID NOT DEPART
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS .
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1991) governs the
consideration for Review by Writ of Certiorari. Review by Writ of
Certiorari is not a matter of right.

Rule 46 (c) discusses those decisions

rendered by the Court of Appeals that depart from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings. The defendant relies solely on Rule 46 (c)
in its attempt to obtain a Writ of Certiorari. See Defendant's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, p. 2. Rule 46 (c) requires a showing that "a panel of
the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of
the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Although the defendant states
that the court of appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed
from the excepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision, the record is devoid
of any issue which might depart from the usual course of judicial
proceedings.

In fact, the Defendant's brief is a desperate attempt to

get this Court to revisit the factual issues of this case for the third time.
First Colony's brief argues that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
facts, and failed to view them from the record in the light most favorable
to First Colony.

Plaintiffs submit that the Court of Appeals did not

misapprehend the facts, nor did they fail to view them in the light most
5

favorable to First Colony. Contrary to defendant's present contentions, the
Appellate Court adopted the legal arguments and factual background
forwarded by the defendant.
In reaching its ruling, the Court of Appeals cited in a footnote
sections of the Utah Insurance Code, as instructional to the issue of how
insurance policies, other than temporary life insurance, may be cancelled.
"...[C]ancellation of insurance is effective only after the delivery of a first
class mailing of a written notice to the policy holder." Utah Code Ann. §
31A-21-303 (1) (a). However, the Court did not adopt the plaintiffs
argument that written notice should be required in all cases. Instead, the
court adopted the defendants position that "adequate notice" is all that is
required. The Court of Appeals relied upon Ouindlen v. Prudential Ins.
Co.. 482 F. 2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejection of application requires
communication from company to applicant, as whole purpose of
prepayment receipt is to assure an applicant that he is insured until
company acts ~ not that he is insured if the company acts); Northern Ins.
Co. v. Mabrv. 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P. 2d 347, 349 (1966) ("[t]hough
mutual consent to cancel may be expressed or implied from the
circumstances . . .such presupposes some communication from the insured
to the mind of the insurer."); Transamerican Ins. Co. v. Bank of Mantee.
241 So. 2d 822, 825 (Miss. 1970) (cancellation must be definite, clear and
unequivocal); Colorado Life Co. v. Teaque. 117 S.W. 2d 849, 856 (Tx.
Civ. App. 1938) ("[i]nsurer cannot terminate the risk so assumed otherwise
than by notice brought home to the insured in his lifetime that his
application was rejected.").
The plaintiff argued to the Court of Appeals that adequate notice of
rejection requires written notice and the return of premium. The Court of
6

Appeals disagreed with that position and agreed with defendant that Utah
law establishes that a contract of temporary insurance is effectively
terminated when notice is clearly and unequivocally communicated to the
applicant in an unambiguous manner, (Opinion at 8). However, the court
found that clear and unambiguous notice was not given. In addition, the
court held that no effective date of termination of the temporary insurance
was given and there was no indication when the premium payment would
be returned.(Opinion at 8). In so ruling, the Appellate Court did not
depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.
The undisputed fact in this case is that the defendant First Colony
never notified either of the Stevensons personally, nor by any form of
written notice, that they intended to decline coverage on LaMar Stevenson.
(Opinion at 2) Since there was no written or verbal communication by the
defendant First Colony, it rests its "clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous"
notice argument on an undocumented phone conversation between Mrs.
Stevenson (not the insured) and "long time agent" Fleiss, of Talbert
Corporation in Salt Lake. In a response to a deposition question about
whether she understood, after a phone conversation with Mr. Fleiss, that
"First Colony wouldn't cover you", she responded, "probably".

See

deposition of Maurine Stevenson at 105, attached hereto as Appendix 3.
On three occasions in his deposition, agent Fleiss denies ever talking to
either of the Stevensons about any First Colony rejection, and stated,
(Fleiss deposition, pages 55, 69, 104) "That would have been handled in
Denver. "(Fleiss deposition at 69). See deposition of Roger Fleiss, pages
55, 69, and 104, attached hereto as Appendix 4.
The Appellate Court acknowledged the conversation, but found that
such a phone call was not adequate notice. "In addition, there is no
7

evidence in the record concerning the contents of the communication. No
effective date of termination of the temporary insurance was given and
there was no indication when the premium payment would be returned."
(Opinion page 8.)
The defendant argues that there was a clear intent to return the
premium even though no document in writing and no conversation with the
Stevensons is found until almost two months after Mr. Stevenson's death.
In its Petition for Writ Of Certiorari, the defendant argues that there was
an intent evidenced to return the premium. See defendant's Petition, page
7. What the defendant does not say in its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
is that this clear intent to return the premium was in fact a hearsay note,
never seen by either LaMar or Maurine Stevenson, dated September 29,
1986, 48 days after the alleged clear and unambiguous notice of
declination. Cindy at United Underwriters included this note as part of a
document prepared on November 21, 1986, more than a month after the
death of LaMar Stevenson. See November 21 document, attached hereto as
Appendix 5. It is undisputed that there was never a written notice or
attempt to return the premium (due to a "slight oversight," defendant's
Petition, page 7) until almost two months after Mr. Stevenson's death.
Two different courts have found that these dubious facts do not impart the
requisite clear and unequivocal notice and intent to return the premium
required by law.
Finally, the defendant argues that the Bankers Life application is
proof that LaMar Stevenson had clear notice of the declination of the First
Colony policy for two reasons: 1) he marked "yes" in the space after
question No. 30, "Have you ever had life or health insurance rated,
declined, modified or cancelled?" , and 2) because he signed the application
8

with a note filled in at number 30, regarding his business filing chapter 11
bankruptcy. Of course LaMar Stevenson would have answered "yes" to
Number 30. His Chubb policy had just been cancelled for non payment of
premium.

After Stevenson completed the application, he gave the

application to Norman Close, who only then added the comment to the
application, disclosing that Stevenson had been declined Coverage by First
Colony. Norman Close never discussed with the Stevensons what he had
made additions to the application. Opinion at 3. See, also, Bankers Life
application, attached hereto as Appendix 6.
The Appellate Court ruled that there was "no effective date of
termination" given, and the fact is, there was not.

Still, First Colony

requests that this Court revisit these same issues for the third time.
Defendant argues that the two lower courts have so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that this Court's
supervision is required.

The plaintiff believes that the decision is well

within the mainstream of current Utah judicial thought as evidenced by the
cases which the Appellate Court cites.
When the Supreme Court has ruled on an issue and the Appellate
Court is faithful in following the Court's decision, the Appellate Court
cannot be said to have departed from the accepted norm.
CONCLUSION
The defendant states no persuasive reason for granting a Writ of
Certiorari. Along with a long settled question of law, in absence of
conflicting court decisions, or a total misapprehension of the facts before
it, the plaintiffs believe that Supreme Court consideration of these issues is
unnecessary. Defendant's denials, delays and appeals have denied Maurine
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Stevenson justice for more than five years. Defendant's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari should be denied.
DATED this

CM

day of July, 1992.

ALLEN IWOUNG
Attorney for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Objection to Appellee's Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Utah was sent by U.S. Postal Service, postage prepaid,
this

23

day of July, 1992, to:

Denton M. Hatch, Esq.
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
D. Gary Christian, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Talbert Corporation and
Roger Fleiss
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

J.

10

APPENDDC
Opinion Court of Appeals
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing
Maurine Stevenson Deposition, p. 105
Roger Fleiss Deposition, pp. 55, 69, 104
Roger Fleiss Deposition Exhibits 19 and 23
Bankers Life Application

Tabl

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

MAR

31992

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Maurine Stevenson, as personal
representative of LaMar
Stevenson, and as trustee of
LaMar D. Stevenson Trust,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No- 910561-CA

Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Appellee,
F I L E D
(March 3 , 1992)

v.
First Colony Life Insurance
Company: Talbert Corporation;
and Roger Fleiss,
Defendants, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant.

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Ray M. Harding
Attorneys:

Allen K. Young and Douglas A. Baxter, Springville,
for Appellant
Denton M. Hatch and Roger R. Fairbanks, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
JACKSON, Judge:
In May of 1986, LaMar Stevenson, having been delinquent on
several premiums due on a life insurance policy with Chubb Life
American, was cancelled by Chubb. Stevenson then sought new life
insurance coverage on himself through Roger Fleiss, an insurance
salesman, and Talbert Corporation,1 Fleiss7s employer at all

1. Talbert Corporation has offices in Salt Lake City, Utah and
Denver, Colorado. Roger Fleiss was affiliated with the Salt Lake
City office at all times relevant to.this case, and Norman Close
was affiliated with the Denver office. "Talbert Corporation,"
for purposes of this opinion, refers to the corporation, and no
particular office, unless otherwise designated.

times relevant to this case. Talbert Corporation and Fleiss
recommended to Stevenson that he seek life insurance through
First Colony Life Insurance Company.
Stevenson filled out and signed an application provided b
Talbert Corporation through Fleiss for life insurance with Fir
Colony in June 1986. The application was signed by Stevenson
the proposed insured, by Roger Fleiss as witness,, and by Norma
Close of the Denver office of Talbert Corporation as licensed
registered agent. Someone wrote on the original application t
it was for $1,000,000 coverage. That figure was crossed out a
$500,000 written in its place. All parties agree that Stevens
applied for $500,000 in the life insurance application.
Stevenson tendered a check payable to First Colony in the amou
of $410 shortly after the application was completed. The chec
was dated July 7, 1986 and represented the first semiannual
premium payment. A conditional receipt was issued to Stevensc
by First Colony which set forth the conditions under which
conditional coverage would become effective prior to policy
delivery. The conditional receipt was referred to in two
separate paragraphs on the application, and was attached to tt
application as the last page. The receipt was dated July 7,
1986, and bears only the signature of Norman Close. The
conditional receipt further stated that the total amount of li
insurance which may become effective prior to policy delivery
could not exceed $300,000. First Colony introduced evidence
which indicated that Stevenson was aware the conditional polic
was for $3 00,000, and that he further agreed in a telephone
conversation with a First Colony representative to lower the
amount of coverage provided in the conditional receipt to
$250,000. First Colony negotiated Stevenson's premium check
shortly thereafter.
In August 1986, Stevenson's wife, Maurine Stevenson,
contacted the Salt Lake office of Talbert Corporation to ask \
her husband had not received a policy from First Colony. The
record indicates that she spoke with an unidentified person ii
that office, who informed her that First Colony was not going
insure Stevenson. The reason given to her was that one of
Stevenson7s companies was in bankruptcy. Neither Stevenson n<
his wife received notice of declination from First Colony. TJ
parties do not dispute that First Colony did not notify eithe:
the Stevensons personally or by any form of written notice,
addition, nothing in the record indicates First Colony sent
written notice to Talbert Corporation, and the record is uncL
as to how someone at Talbert Corporation became aware that Fl
Colony had declined Stevenson's application.
Stevenson sought life insurance coverage with Bankers Li
Company in early October 1986. After Stevenson completed the
necessary information on the application, he gave the applica
to Norman Close, who added a comment to the application,
2

disclosing that Stevenson had been declined coverage by First
Colony. Norman Close never discussed with the Stevensons what he
had added to the application. Stevenson was killed in an
accident on October 18, 1986. At the time of his death, neither
United Underwriters nor First Colony had returned the premium of
$410 paid by Stevenson. The premium payment was not tendered to
Maurine Stevenson until December 1986.
The plaintiff, Maurine Stevenson, filed this action against
defendants First Colony, Roger Fleiss, and Talbert Corporation,
claiming, among other things, that a valid contract of insurance
existed at the time of her husband's death. This contention was
based upon the fact that no written notice of rejection of the
life insurance application was given by First Colony and the
premium payment was not returned until months after Stevenson's
death. The original complaint stated the life insurance in
effect at the time of Stevenson's death was for $250,000. The
complaint was amended to reflect an amount of $500,000.
On October 19, 1989, First Colony filed a motion for summary
judgment, contending that the temporary contract of insurance
created by the conditional receipt terminated with First Colony's
rejection of Stevenson's insurance application and oral
notification to the Stevensons, through Fleiss or Talbert
Corporation. Maurine Stevenson countered with a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that a valid contract of insurance
remained in force as a result of the failure of First Colony to
give notice of rejection and to return the premium.
After considering the motions for summary judgment without
oral argument, the trial court granted Maurine Stevenson's motion
for summary judgment and denied First Colony's motion. The trial
court then entered judgment in the amount of $500,000 for Maurine
Stevenson. On March 2, 1990, after oral argument on the amount
of the judgment, the trial court vacated its earlier order and
entered judgment for Maurine Stevenson in the amount of $300,000,
based on only the terms of the conditional receipt, and not the
face amount of the application. We affirm.
ISSUES
Both parties appeal. Maurine Stevenson appeals the trial
court's determination that the amount of the policy which became
effective upon issuance of the conditional receipt was $3 00,000.
In arguing that judgment should be for $500,000, she claims there
was a reasonable expectation of full and immediate coverage in
the amount of $500,000; that the conditional receipt cannot be
construed to limit the amount of that liability; that the policy
must be considered together with the receipt; that if an
ambiguity exists, it should be resolved in favor of the insured;
that a handwritten provision prevails over a printed limitation;
3

and that this court should impose full liability on First Colon
in view of First Colony's delay in notifying the Stevensons of
rejection and in returning the premium paid by the Stevensons.
First Colony appeals the trial court's determination that
life insurance coverage was in effect at the time of Stevenson'
death. Specifically, First Colony challenges the trial court's
determination that First Colony did not effectively terminate t
temporary insurance contract; that the Stevensons did not recei
adequate notice that First Colony had rejected Stevenson's
application for life insurance; and that written notice and
return of premium payment was required to terminate the tempore
insurance contract. In the alternativef First Colony claims tl
if its life insurance coverage was in effect at the time of
Stevenson's death, the judgment should have been for $250,000.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court has recently articulated its settled standard <
review for summary judgement: "Summary judgment can be grante<
when no genuine issue of material fact existsf and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Silcox v.
Skaggs Aloha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 623, 623 (Utah App* 1991)
(citations omitted). "Inasmuch as a challenge to summary
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, because,
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, t
Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.'*
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (citation
omitted). As for the trial court's determination on the amoun
of damages, the trial court interpreted the insurance contract
a matter of law and therefore we review its construction under
correctness standard. See Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d
645, 647 (Utah App. 1987).
While we would normally address those issues raised in th
direct appeal first and then address the cross-appeal issues,
this case we first address cross-appellant First Colony's
challenge to the summary judgment. If we find that summary
judgment was improperly granted, we need not reach the other
issues raised by either party.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MAURINE STEVENSON
First Colony alleges that Maurine Stevenson's own admiss:
during discovery establish that First Colony declined to insm
her husband, that the Stevensons were aware of the declinatioi
and that First Colony therefore unconditionally terminated tin
temporary contract of insurance prior to Stevenson's death. '
trial court disagreed, finding that "because there was not
4

adequate notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance had been
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, the
contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr.
Stevenson's death.11 Therefore, we must determine whether the
notice to Talbert Corporation that Stevenson's application for
life insurance had been declined by First Colony was adequate
notice to Stevenson to terminate the temporary contract of
insurance, and whether return of the premium by First Colony to
Stevenson was a condition precedent to unilateral termination.2
The trial court explicitly relied upon Smith v. Westland
Life Ins, Co.. 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), in reaching its decision
that the policy was in effect at the time of Stevenson's death.
In that case, the supreme court of California held that when an
insurer has received an application for life insurance together
with payment of the first premium, a provisional contract
granting temporary insurance is created. That contract is not
terminated, according to the California court, until the insurer
has nullified the two factors that gave rise to the applicant's
expectation that he or she was covered: "his signing of the
application and his payment of the premium." Id. at 442.
In Smith, the applicant signed an application for life
insurance and tendered the first month's premium. The insurance
agent provided the applicant with a conditional receipt, similar
to the receipt issued in the case at bar. After the insurance
company processed the application, the agent delivered to the
applicant a policy which modified some of the terms originally
agreed upon. The applicant refused to accept or sign the
modified policy. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade
the applicant to accept the policy as modified, the agent told
the applicant his premium would be refunded. The following day
the applicant died. The issue on appeal was whether, prior to
the applicant's death, the insurance company effectuated a
termination of the temporary insurance.
The court found that the applicant had not received written
notice of termination of his temporary insurance and "[o]ral
communications between Smith and Westland's agents were generally
shrouded in terms of his acceptance of a policy with minor
modifications." Id. at 444. Further, the applicant never
received a refund of his premium before his fatal accident. The
2. Both First Colony and Maurine Stevenson attempt to frame the
issue in this case as one of "is written notice required?"
However, the trial court, while stating the issue as "whether
written notice and return of the premium is required to terminate
a temporary life insurance contract," held that "because there
was not adequate notice . . . and because the premium was not
returned timely, the contract was in full force and effect at the
time of Mr. Stevenson's death."
5

court's rationale rested upon the principle of effectuating tl
expectations of the ordinary applicant. Id. at 441. The cou]
concluded that an insurer does not terminate temporary covera<
until ff(a) the insurer has actually rejected the application <
by appropriate notice communicated such rejection to the insu:
and (b) refunded the premium payment to the insured." Id* at
440. The trial court in the instant case quoted this language
from Smith and held that the First Colony temporary insurance
contract had not been terminated.
Relying on Winger v. Gem State Mut.. 22 Utah 2d 132, 449
P.2d 982 (1969) and Long v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co,, 29 ,
2d 204, 507 P.2d 375 (1973), First Colony argues that it
effectively terminated its obligations under the temporary li
insurance contract by rejection of the application and notice
the rejection to Talbert Corporation. In Winger, the insuran
company which had issued conditional life insurance coverage
an applicant determined that the applicant was not insurable.
The company sent written notice of rejection to its agent wit
instructions to notify the applicant that his application had
been declined. The applicant died before the insurance compa
agent was able to contact him. The court held no contract of
insurance existed at the time of death because the insurance
company "acted with reasonable dispatch in attempting to
communicate to [the applicant] its action declining his
application." Winger, 449 P.2d at 983. In Long, the Utah
Supreme Court first determined that a conditional receipt
"created temporary insurance coverage until such time as the
insurers had considered the application and determined to iss
policy or reject the risk." Long, 507 P.2d at 379. The Lone
court further held that "the insurer cannot terminate the ris
assumed unless the insured is notified during his lifetime tithe application was rejected." Id.
We agree with First Colony that Utah law establishes the
contract of temporary insurance is effectively terminated wh€
the application is rejected and the applicant is given adequ*
notice of that rejection.3 However, none of the cases cited
First Colony reach the issue of what is "adequate notice." :

3. See also Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co,. 19 Utah
174, 428 P.2d 163, 167 (1967) (no notice of rejection to insi
and no return of premium meant policy in effect at time of
death). The Smith case, relied upon by the trial court, als<
articulated this general rule: "the most frequently stated :
appears to be that a temporary contract of insurance is
terminated by rejection of the application and notice thereo
the insured," 539 P.2d at 439 (citing 9 Couch on Insurance,
§ 39:207, at 653 (2d ed. 1962)).
6

Williams v. First Colony Life Ins, Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah
1979). The trial court did not find the insurance contract to be
ambiguous and neither do we.5 See id. (supreme court finds
similar contract to be unambiguous).
We agree with the trial court, that as a matter of law the
amount of temporary insurance in effect at the time of
Stevenson,s death was $300,000, the amount printed on the
conditional receipt, and not $500,000, the amount requested in
the application.

5. First Colony argues that the trial court failed to take into
consideration factual evidence which indicated that the amount of
insurance created by the issuance of the conditional receipt was
limited to $250,000. The evidence upon which First Colony relies
is contained in two affidavits. The affidavit of Leonard
Reynolds, Executive Vice President of United Underwriters states
that it is the standard practice of the insurance industry not to
issue a conditional receipt for an amount exceeding $250,000. An
exhibit attached to the affidavit of Loretta Stacey, an employee
of First Colony, indicates that United Underwriters advised
Talbert Corporation that coverage could not exceed $250,000, and
that Stevenson agreed to drop the amount of conditional coverage
to $250,000. This exhibit, a memo to the file of Stevenson, was
prepared on May 5, 1987, seven months after Stevenson died, and
eleven months after the insurance policy application had been
completed. Nowhere else in the record is there any evidence
supporting these contentions. No evidence has been produced
which indicates who spoke with Stevenson regarding any aspect of
the conditional receipt, let alone the limitation on the amount
of coverage.
When the trial court determined that the written documents
were clear and unambiguous regarding the amount of coverage then
in force, it did not need to consider evidence which was
extrinsic to the writings. First Colony argues that the $300,000
limitation of the conditional receipt.is clear and unambiguous
and we agree. Because we agree with First Colony7s contention on
this point, we are not persuaded by their argument that this
written limitation of $300,000 was orally modified by a phone
call that allegedly took place between an unknown representative
of United Underwriters or Talbert Corporation and Stevenson.
9

CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor
Maurine Stevenson, and the judgment for $300,000.

Nonifan H. Jacksoq^Judge

WE CONCUR:

$6 &1' SU&itfrU
wudith M. Billings^ Judged

Leonard H. Russon, Judge
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Tab 2

the absence of express contractual or statutory provisions/ we
must identify what constitutes adequate notice to terminate a
temporary life insurance contract.
"From the standpoint of content, all that is required of a
notice of cancellation is that it be sufficiently specific to
manifest an intent to cancel, and to identify the policy in
question." 17 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 67:138 at 599 (rev. ed.
1985); see also Ouindlen v. Prudential Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 876,
879 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejection of application requires
communication from company to applicant, as whole purpose of
prepayment receipt is to assure an applicant that he is insured
until company acts—not that he is insured if, the company acts) ;
Northern Ins. Co. v. Mabrv, 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P.2d 347, 349
(1966) ("[t]hough mutual consent to cancel may be expressed or
implied from the circumstances . . . such presupposes some
communication from the insured to the mind of the insurer.");
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bank of Mantee, 241 So. 2d 822, 825
(Miss. 1970) (cancellation must be definite, clear and
unequivocal); Colorado Life Co. v. Teaque. 117 S.W.2d 849, 856
(Tx. Civ. App. 1938) ("[i]nsurer cannot terminate the risk so
assumed otherwise than by notice brought home to the insured in
his lifetime that his application was rejected."). See generally
45 C.J.S., Insurance. § 450 p. 86 (1946) (in absence of
contractual or statutory provision as to form of notice, all that
is required is that notice is definite and unequivocally shows

4. Various sections of the Utah Insurance Code, for example, are
instructional in determining how insurance policies other than
temporary life insurance contracts may be cancelled by the
insurer or the insured. Termination of many insurance policies
is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-3 03 (Supp. 1991) . That
section provides that cancellation is effective only after the
delivery or first class mailing of a written notice to the policy
holder. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(2)(b) (Supp. 1991)
(explicitly excluding applicability to life and disability
insurance, see, e.g., § 31A-21-303(1) (a) ) .
Similarly, under § 31A-22-423 (1991), the section that deals
with examination periods for life insurance policies, the policy
owner may return the policy within ten days after its delivery.
"Return" is explicitly defined in that section to mean "delivery
to the insurer or its agent, or mailing the policy to either,
properly addressed and stamped for first class handling, with a
written statement on the policy or an accompanying writing that
it is being returned for termination 9f coverage• See also
Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Actual Receipt of Cancellation
Notice Mailed bv Insurer as Prerequisite to Cancellation of
Insurance. 40 A.L.R. 4th 867, 876-77 (1985) (overview of methods
by which insurance policies can be effectively cancelled).
7

cancellation will take effect at the expiration of prescribed
period)•
The above cited sources reveal that a declination or
cancellation notice must be communicated clearly enough to th<
insured or applicant so that he or she understands that the
insurance coverage is no longer effective. To be sufficient,
notice must be definite and certain, and leave no doubt in th<
mind of the recipient that the rejection of insurance is
effective upon receipt of the notice. The only evidence Firs
Colony puts forth concerning the manner of communicating
declination is Maurine Stevenson's deposition and her respons
to interrogatories. This evidence reveals only that someone
Talbert Corporation informed Maurine Stevenson orally over th
telephone that First Colony had declined the application. Th
phone call was initiated by Maurine Stevenson, who was concer
that her husband had not received the policy. Neither of the
Stevensons ever spoke directly to anyone from First Colony.
First Colony does not claim to know who from their office mad
the communication, or to whom at Talbert Corporation it was m
We disagree with First Colony's contention that a phone call
by an unidentified agent of First Colony, to an unidentified
person other than Stevenson, the applicant, which allegedly
communicated First Colony's decision to decline Stevenson's
application, was adequate notice. In addition, there is no
evidence in the record concerning the contents of the
communication. No effective date of termination of the tempo
insurance was given and there was no indication when the preic
payment would be returned.
In sum, we hold that notice must be clearly and
unequivocally communicated to the applicant in an unambiguous
manner. In the case before us, we cannot say that First Cole
effectively dispatched notice to Stevenson that his temporary
insurance was terminated.
AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT
Both parties have claimed error in the amount of damages
awarded to Maurine Stevenson. Maurine Stevenson appeals the
trial court's entry of judgment for $3 00,000, claiming it was
low; First Colony appeals, claiming the amount was too high.
Maurine Stevenson urges us to hold as a matter of law tl
the life insurance application and conditional receipt are
ambiguous, and that any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms
should be construed in favor of the insured. While this is 1
it is also true that in determining the intent of this contr<
we examine the language of the contract itself first, Mand ui
there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no justifies
for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol evidence."
A
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Maurine Stevenson, as personal
representative of LaMar
Stevenson, and as trustee of
LaMar D. Stevenson Trust,

2 2 195

r. Nocnan
ORDER DENYING' ^ ^ court
PETITION FOR R E K £ A £ ^ A p p e a U

Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
Case No. 910561-CA

v.
First Colony Life Insurance
Company; Talbert Corporation;
and Roger Fleiss,
Defendants, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellee and
cross-appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed March 17,
1992, and appellant and cross-appellee's Response to
Petition for Rehearing, filed April 17, 1992,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellee and
cross-appellant's Petition for Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 20th day of May, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Ncfrgan H. J a c k s o n . ^ a u d g e

i t h M. B i l l i n g s ,
I DISSENT:

Judged

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby, certify that onrthe 21st day of May, 1992, a. true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed belows
Allen K. Young
Douglas A. Baxter
Young & Kester
Attorneys at Law
101 East 200 South
Springville, UT 84663
Denton M. Hatch
Roger R. Fairbanks
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C,
Attorneys at Law
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
D. Gary Christian
Kipp & Christian, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 21st day of May, 1992.

By ^[}r//y
Deputy

)&/?/#/&,
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Tab 3

105
Q

You may or may not have received it, but you don't

recall it?
A

That's correct*

Q

It was your understanding, I believe you said, that

when you wrote the check, Exhibit 17, you understood that you
had coverage with First Colony?
A

Yeah.

Q

But you understood t h a t t h a t e x i s t e d up t o , I think

you said e a r l i e r , a c e r t a i n p o i n t t h a t you had d i s c u s s e d , and
I assume you meant by t h a t statement when you were n o t i f i e d by
Roger F l e i s s t h a t F i r s t Colony wouldn't cover you?
A

That's correct*

Q

From the p o i n t t h a t Roger F l e i s s n o t i f i e d you or

United U n d e r w r i t e r s , whichever i t was f i r s t , you understood
t h a t you d i d n ' t have coverage with F i r s t Colony L i f e ; is t h a t
correct?
A

Probably.

Q

When you wrote the premium and you gave i t to Roger

or T a l b e r t Corporation, and when they s t a r t e d to look for
another p o l i c y for you, i t was your understanding, w a s n ' t
t h a t you would not r e c e i v e the premium back —
A

Yes.

Q

—

A

That's correct.

Q

You knew that First Colony had denied your

the refund back?

it,

Tab 4

Q

What is your independent recollection of it, do

you have any?
A

Yes.

It was they were not getting it back

apparently in a timely fashion.
follow up.

We had to continually

That is, Denver had to continually follow upv

with the agency which we dealt through for First Colony to
get the money back.
Q

Do you know how many times they followed up?

A

The file would indicate that.

Q

Do you have any independent recollection of

anything you did in relation to that, any
A

—

Nothing.
MR. CHRISTIAN:

Let him finish his question,

Roger.
Q

Did you have any conversations with Mrs.

Stevenson

—

A

Restate the question.

Q

—

that you recall?

Sure.

Did you have any

independent conversations with Mrs. Stevenson about getting
that money back?
A

No.

Q

Did you have any conversations about why or why

not?

Did you ever advise Mrs. Stevenson that First Colony

had rejected them?
A

No.
55
Computerized Transcript

1

that means?

2

A

3
4
5

written.
Q

Well, I can't really tell from the way it's
It looks like E-L-L, but I don't know.
Would that stand for something in insurance

company terms?

6

A

No.

7

Q

Were you ever advised that the insurance with

Not that I'm aware of anyway.

8

First Colony —

9

advised that the lifeinsurance policy with First Colony was

"you" meaning you, Roger Fleiss, ever

10

declined because of the financial info?

11

MR. CHRISTIAN:

12
13
14

Ever?

From the time it was

applied for until today?
Q

(by Mr. Young)

No.

Thank you, Counsel.

Prior

to the death of LaMar D. Stevenson.

15

A

Was I ever advised?

16

Q

By anyone.

17

A

I would have had knowledge through conversation

18

with Denver.

19

Q

20

Did you have any specific knowledge in talking to

either Mr. or Mrs. Stevenson about that?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Do you know what "submit case to First Colony

That would have been handled in Denver.

23

One" is?

24

than First Colony?

25

A

Is First Colony One a different insurance company

I would guess.

A lot of companies have more than

69
Computerized Transcript

1

is written that says we are not going to insure this man.

2

A

That would go through our Denver office.

3

Q

Have you ever seen anything?
MR. CHRISTIAN:

4
5
6

seen such a document.
A

7
8
9

His question is have you ever

No.
MR. CHRISTIAN:

We understand we have the

complete Denver file, but I can't swear to that either.
Q

(by Mr. Young)

I show you what has been marked

10

as Deposition Exhibit Number 19.

You received a copy of

11

that letter after Mr. Stevenson's death?

12

A

Yes, I would have.

13

Q

And it says that she typed the sequence of

14

events, and I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 23

15

and ask you if that would have been the attachment to that

16

letter?

17

A

It would have been.

18

Q

So you have had that in your file since November?

19

A

That would be correct.

20

Q

Did you, meaning Roger Fleiss, ever contact LaMar

21

Stevenson or Maurine Stevenson and say that First Colony had

22

rejected the application for insurance in any way?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Do you know if anyone did?

25

A

No.
104
Computerized Transcript

Tab 5

Talbert corporation
"Y BONOS ANO INSURANCE
: R COLORAOO
D JUNCTION. COLORAOO
.R. WYOMING
JME CITY, UTAH

Noverrber 21, 1986
Mr. Boger Fleiss
The Talbert Corporation of Utah
205 West 700 South
Salt Lake Utah 84101
Dear Roger:
Enclosed in this envelope are copies of First Colony and Bankers
Life applications, underwriting requirements submitted to the
conpanies, and notes from our files for the insured Lamar Stevenson*
After reviewing the file, I typed a sequence of events and nave
enclosed a copy of this for your records. Should you have any
questions or need further information please give us a call.
Thank you*
Yours very truly,

Christine Fresquez
Account Assistant/Nontan R. Close
Enclosure

? 6.

ImJj^

rrui typo's

"Ok. ^JJl ']

<lXto^f

ORDER OF EVENTS CONTINUED
7-14-86

Sent application and aviation questionnaire to
client.

7-21-86

Fecieved and forward application and aviation
questionnaire to ccirpany, First Colony, witn k pren.

7-30-86

First Colony requested alcohol questionnaire
as underwriting requirement.

8-4-36

Cindy/United Underwriters to contact First Colony
as to "why" the alcohol questionnaire.
Due to inspection report.

8-7-86

Sent insured alcohol questionnaire.

8-12-36

Cindv/lYiited Undar;/ritars has advised us First
Colony cannot place coverage to financial miorraticr
obtained from inspection report. However, First
Colony will submit to reinsurer as First Colony
One. (Universal Life product)

8-13-86

Fecevied alcohol questionnaire frcm client.

8-23-86

Sent Roger First Colony Life One illustration and Bar
Life 1 YFT illustration.

9-27-86

Per Nona send Lamar The Bankers Life application and
aviation questionnaire. Bankers to use First
Colony exam. Sent application and questionnaire to
client.

9-29^86

Per United Underwriters First Colony closed file
9-26-86 r refund of prenium submitted with applicaticwithin the next ten days.

10-1-86

Submitted Eankers Life application and requirements
to conpany.

OF EVENTS
1-13-86

dvised Roger lapse of Chubb Life America
olicy.

1-30-86

lient has sent premium in to Qiubb 1-17-86.
bntacted Chubb , they have premium but need
einstatement form.

2-5-86

ent client reinstatement forms to be mailed
Lirectly to conpany.

3-20-86

lent client copy of reinstatement to have
manswered questions corrpleted.

4-8-86

deceived form fron client

4-25-86

advised conpany of info* but icotpany requires
late client was in the hospital* Contacted
toger. Roger called back with date. Coroany
closed.

4-28-86

intact Chubb with date of hospital date.

5-1-86

Reinstatement in process per Chubb.

5-9-86

Efecieved notice of cancel of reinstatement from
Zhubb due to time delay of info, and form too
Did to use. Can reopen reinstatement with
three h premiums and new form. Advised Foger.

5^19^6

Contact Chubb to get exact amount due or min prem.
Darlene A. to call back with info. Need $1,147.4<

5-28-86

Sent client other conpany illustrations
cc; to Boger

6-10«r36

Sent Boger First Colony applicatio, Lamar
had advised Poger this is the product they want
to go with, for a face amount of $500,000.

7-1-86

Had client examed

"fcXHlBrt

Tab 6

1. Fr;nt fuii name of Ffopcsed Insured
•

I Age State of
1 Birth
Mo.! Day' Yr. i
\S>** »• «Cokd

Single Quarried Q Widowed Q Divorced Q Separated

2.

Home address

3.

Premium notices t o Q

£0

/3 l39lV7> ^7 A

County

City

State

m

SCC. S-rC

kbl^jjjj;^

Zip

Years lived tr-

J7_
Proposed* Insured at home

Q Proposed Insured at business

•

Owner at address ir

4o Q Disability Income plan desired. Complete questions 1-8, 18-40 and D.I. Supplemental Application
5*

Disability Income in force (group, state, union, salary ,
continuation or individual)?
Q Yes
Q No
]

Company or
Source

Will policy applied for replace or change any c
Disability Income insurance?
Q Yes Q No

AmtJ Benefit Elim. :

Type of
^Coverage
1

Give details
7.

i

I 8.

D.I. Dividends to Q Reduce prem. •
D.I. mode

Q Annual

j 12. Life mode
• Annual
"i
Q Semi-annual

Be paid in <

Q Semi-annual
n Quarterly
Q Monthly

Q PJ

•

PAC

/ wf +
LIFE plan desired
1
13. Life Insurance in fcrc ? _ D Yes _ Q No _
(For AL show premium OR plan desired)
ADB
-Yr. of fer<
J Ufe
Amount S £ <TOy G^O
»
!
^Company
amount amount VVDB issue or bu
_ _ for S.
Term rider
yrSo
Mo. Inc. for _
FIR i
1
1 _J_ J
!
term rider $_
Q WDB Q ADB: base amt $
1
T" I ~f 1
Q PAPA
Total ann. prem. (Divs. must be add'ns.) j • Change of Insured Q GPO/GIO $
j 14. Will policy applied for replace or chang^any other
••Spouse Term
year benefit for S
annuity insurance? • Yes
Q>fo
••Family OR Q Children Term for
units
Give details
—~_
•'Payor Death or Disability
••Payor Death
Jf Proposed Insured is under age 15 complete:
•Complete Spouse, Child, Payor Application
Apptreaqt (Parent, Guardian, etc.)
10. • APL
ApplicantVAddress
9.

1

11.

m

i

Dividends to Q Reduce prem. Q Purchase add! insc
• Accumulate at interest
• Be paid in cash
• EPO - Return CV*
Q EPO - return of prem.*
/Balance as checked
• Improved policy - AL only

Applicant's relationship to
Amt fife ins. on parent or guardia;
Amount 0/ life ins. on other children S„
Is child in school? Q Yes • No Grade leve
Answer 16 and 17jgn PROPOSED JNSURED if age 15 or older, otherwise on the Applicant (Parent, Guardiar
a.
Fr*ni*y*r Afh'tof f) ? \Sc/?s
Years there
[ 17. a. Occupation
! 16.
b. Duties
b. Type of business
'
\
c. Address Qt*Q Mr/Jh
n.nn
f>)*zt
Annual Earned Income
fftr*/>9<*i*,i
Utah
Duties
d. Any part time jobs?
ficc,3
18.

Owner

19.

Owner's Addf*?s$
Relationship to Proposed Insured
Taxpayer ID Number
Contingent Owner
Unless stated above, owner, while living is (a) Proposed
Insured if 2™ 15 or older or (b) Applicant if Proposed
Insured is under age 15. This is Q Permanent or
• Temporary to Q age 18 Q age 21 or Q ace 25.

Beneficiary and relationship to Proposed Insurer
A A/Tin r 7$. V j f / f V M ^ ^ 7 7 V J A A ^

T«,s

I

Aon?J*M4

Oo T W

Cf.j

Contingent Beneficiary:
•

Proceeas to be left at interest. Eeneftcia/y
election and withdrawal rights.
Pay interest
— — (free
;
I

Exhibit G

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

N2 306123

INSURANCE APPLICATION

Yes No
Do you plan to live or travel (other than vacation) outside of the U.S.?
Have you ever had life or health insurance rated, declined, modified or cancelled?
Have you ever recuested or received ter.efits because of injury or sickness?
Do ycu have an amplication for life or d:sao;!;ty income insurance pending in any company, or have you within the
last tnree months aeoliec for such insurance?
Have ycu. or do ycu plan to encage m hang kite cueing, scuca or sky aivmg, stock, modified, soons car, crac
strip, mctcrcvcle, motor boat, snowmcone or other tyce of racing?

,
,
;
j
i
;

[>•
H
n
—

p^

' _^

_I

Are you or do you intend to become a memser of a military service?
• ~~
Crivers license number
(c f**7 & ?&
In the last 2 years have you been cnargea with:
(a) 2 or more motor venicie moving violations or accidents?

PP

Do you plan to fly or have you, within the last five years flown as a pilot, student puot or crew memcer

9

(b) driving while intoxicated?
(c) suspension or revocation of your license?
Have ycu in the last five years been arrested for other than traffic violations?
Are you in a regular exercise program (jogging, swimming, etc.)?
Any family history of heart or kidney oisease, high blood pressure or cancer?
Within tne last 5 years have you:
(a) been treated or counselled or joined an organization for alcohol or drug use?
(b) used amohetamines, barbiturates, seaatives, LSD, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or morpnine, exceot as
preserved by a doctor?
"Yes" answers to 23, 34 and 35 reauire Soons, Aviation, Military Statement respectively. Explain or give reasons
if "Yes" tor questions 29 - 32 and 36 - 40.

•>1<~*
/***<+>

***V

•

ptASa-vJ"

<xpi^,

•esent that all statements in this application are true anc comoiete to the best of my knowleace and belief. 1 uncerstanc trey
-e oasis c: any insurance issued. I agree that, exceot as the Conditional Receiot provides, the Comcany snail incur no :isc.:.:y
ss ana UP.::!: (i) a oolicy is issued (2f the policy is received ana acceoted by the aoplicant and (3) the first cremium :s C2;c. 1
e that these three concitions must occur wnile, as far as tne aoplicant knows, there has been no cnange since the pate c: this
;n the health or any other factor affecting the insurability of any person proposed for insurance. 1 agree that only tne Heme
e is authorized to pass on insuraoiiity or to make, change or discharge any contract or waive any of the Comcany s rents. I
e tr.st the rent to cnange the beneficiary is reserved to the owner unless otherwise provided in question 19. Any cr.arce in
>age, amount, ciass, plan or benefits maae by the Company shown under "Amendments'* is subject to my written ratification.
:erstand the laws of the state listed below shall aopiy to any policy issued.
h»s application is COD CR • I have paid S
for Q Life Q Disability Income insurance. If money za.c
e seen Given the Conditional Receipt in return. I have read it, and uncerstand and agree to its terms.

Signature cf Accucant or Owner (if ether tnan
Proposed Insured) If Owner is Corporation,
Ct:;cer ctr.er than Proposed Insured snouid sign.

Signature of Prcoosed Insure:
(only if over age 9)

